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Does the human mind allow for self-locating at more than one place at a time? Evidence
from neurology, cognitive neuroscience, and experimental psychology suggests that
mental bilocation is a complex, but genuine experience, occurring more frequently than
commonly thought. In this article, we distinguish between different components of
bilocated self-representation: self-localization in two different places at the same time,
self-identification with another body, reduplication of first-person perspective. We argue
that different forms of mental bilocation may result from the combination of these
components. To illustrate this, we discuss evidence of mental bilocation in pathological
conditions such as heautoscopy, during immersion in virtual environments, and in everyday
life, during social interaction. Finally, we consider the conditions for mental bilocation and
speculate on the possible role of mental bilocation in the context of social interaction,
suggesting that self-localization at two places at the same time may prove advantageous
for the construction of a shared space.
Keywords: mental bilocation, perspective taking, autoscopic phenomena, virtual reality, minimal phenomenal
selfhood
In daily life the self is typically tied to one place at a given point
in time and this place coincides with the body. As Husserl puts it:
“I do not have the possibility of distancing myself from my body,
nor it from me” (Husserl, 1952/1989). Self-experience, however,
is not always constrained by the body: empirical research into
self-related disorders and full-body illusions demonstrates that
the spatial unity between body and self can be temporarily sus-
pended. For seconds, andmore seldomminutes, neurological and
psychiatric patients may experience themselves to be localized at,
and to see from, a location outside their physical body (Blanke
and Mohr, 2005). A similar experience might be experimentally
induced in healthy subjects using mirrors or simple virtual reality
devices (Lenggenhager et al., 2007, 2009).
Where does the self localize during such experiences? Out-side
the bodily borders? At the location of the physical body? Does the
humanmind allow for locating atmore than one place at the same
time? In this paper we focus on this latter question, and consider
the spatial and temporal dynamics of the self-localization pro-
cess. In particular, we discuss the possibility that the self might
be distributed over two spatially distinct places at the same time.
Based on the concept of “minimal phenomenal selfhood”
(MPS; Blanke andMetzinger, 2009), our contention is thatmental
bilocation, i.e., localization of the self at two distinct places at the
same time, is not a single perceptual experience but can be broken
down into different components: self-localization in two different
places at the same time, self-identification with another body, and
reduplication of first-person perspective. Different forms ofmental
bilocation may result from the combination of these components.
In this article we will discuss three instances of mental bilocation
in which the above mentioned components appear differentially
present: heautoscopy, virtual presence, and perspective taking (see
Table 1). Although mental bilocation in its complete form is
only experienced during heautoscopy, incomplete forms of men-
tal bilocation may be experienced during immersion in virtual
reality, and in everyday life, during spatial perspective taking.
Incidences of bilocation are reported in many different cul-
tures at many times. We propose that these reports are rooted
in the complex experience of being mentally at two places at the
same time, an experience which—we argue—is more frequent
than commonly thought and might play an important role in the
construction of a shared space.
HEAUTOSCOPY: THE BILOCATED SELF
Heautoscopy, i.e., the encounter with one’s double (Menninger-
Lerchenthal, 1935), is a rare multimodal illusory experience char-
acterized by the reduplication of one’s own body and self (Blanke
and Mohr, 2005). As in other forms of autoscopic phenomena
such as autoscopic hallucination, during heautoscopy the patient
sees a double of herself in the extrapersonal space. This double,
however, is not a mere image or visual hallucination. The self can
be experienced as being at the position of physical body (body-
centered frame of reference) and, simultaneously or in rapid
alternation, at the position of a reduplicate body in the extrap-
ersonal space (alter-body-centered frame of reference; Lopez and
Blanke, 2007). Self-location and first-person visual-perspective
may alternate between an embodied and a disembodied location
and it might be difficult for the subject to decide where the self is
localized (Brugger, 2002). As illustrated by the following example,
the patient may indeed experience to be at both positions at the
same time:
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Table 1 | Instances of mental bilocation in which the three MPS
components are differentially present.
Self-localization
in two different
places at the
same time
Self-
identification
with another
body
Reduplicated
first-person
perspective
He-autoscopy
√ √ √
Virtual presence
√ √
Spatial perspective
taking
√
The patient has the immediate impression as if she were seeing
herself from behind herself. She felt as if she were ‘standing at the
foot of my bed and looking down at myself ’. Yet, [. . .] the patient
also has the impression to ‘see’ from her physical visuo-spatial per-
spective [. . .]. Asked at which of these two positions she thinks
herself to be, she answered that ‘I am at both positions at the same
time’ (Patient 2b, Blanke et al., 2004).
Heautoscopic experiences are often associated with changes in
the awareness of one’s body. Patients may, for example, report
abnormal vestibular sensations such as abnormal lightness or hol-
lowness of the body which may feel “just like an empty shell after
the chick has hatched” (Lukianowitz, 1958).With increasing body
depersonalization, there is an increase in personalization of the
illusory double, to the point that the patient may wonder whether
it is the physical body or rather the reduplicated body which con-
tains the real self (Brugger, 2002). Not only self-localization and
first-person perspective, but also self-identification may therefore
be experienced as “split in two parts” (Brugger et al., 1994).
Heautoscopy of neurological origin has been related to patho-
logical activity patterns primarily localized at the temporo-
parietal-junction (TPJ; Blanke and Mohr, 2005; see Figure 1). In
healthy subjects, a similar duplication of the self with two dis-
tinct and active roles can be experienced during REM sleep, when
the dreamer has both the role of the chief character and that
of the observer or plays different protagonist roles (the pursuer
and the pursued person; Cicogna and Bosinelli, 2001). As heau-
toscopy, these situations may involve oscillations of first-person
perspective and uncertainty relative to perception, feelings, and
emotions (Occhionero and Cicogna, 2011). Because REM sleep
involves considerable deafferentation and reduction of incoming
peripheral vestibular information, this supports the implication
of the vestibular cortex situated at the TPJ in the generation of
heautoscopic experiences.
VIRTUAL PRESENCE: BILOCATION IN VIRTUAL REALITY
A common metric of the quality of virtual environments is the
degree to which the virtual environment creates in the user the
illusion of presence—the subjective experience of being in one
place when physically situated in another (Heeter, 1992; Witmer
and Singer, 1998). Similar feelings of presence at distant places
may arise during teleoperations (Ruff et al., 2002), in telepresence
videoconferencing (Anderson et al., 2001), and during immersion
in cybertherapy settings (Price and Anderson, 2007).
FIGURE 1 | Hypothesized neural correlates of mental bilocation. A
plausible candidate for the neural substrate of mental bilocation is the point
of convergence of the angular, superior temporal, and upper marginal gyri
at the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ). Brain damage or brain dysfunction is
localized at the TPJ in neurological patients experiencing out-of-body and
he-autoscopic phenomena (Blanke et al., 2004). In healthy subjects,
interference with the TPJ by transcranial magnetic stimulation impairs
mental own body transformation (Blanke et al., 2005). Neuroimaging
studies support the role of the TPJ in vestibular processing, integration of
multisensory body related information (Leube et al., 2003), mental imagery
using disembodied self location (Arzy et al., 2006), and experience of
presence in virtual environments (Jäncke et al., 2009; Ganesh et al., 2012).
Finally, cortex at the TPJ has also been involved in visuo-spatial perspective
taking. For instance, TPJ is the classical lesion site in patients with
egocentric spatial neglect, a clinical condition which has been shown to
disturb the patient’s egocentric representation of space (Halligan et al.,
2003). Neuroimaging studies in healthy subjects have revealed TPJ
activation during visuo-spatial perspective changes (Zacks et al., 2003;
Aichhorn et al., 2006; David et al., 2008).
Telepresence and virtual presence are generally thought to
imply a “departure” from the physical environment and an
“arrival” in the mediated environment (Sadowsky and Stanley,
2002). Little, however is, known about the temporal and spa-
tial dynamics of these self-localization processes. May individuals
perceive themselves localized “here” and “there” at the same time?
To investigate variations of presence over time, Wissmath et al.
(2011) employed a two-dimensional continuous measurement
paradigm based on handheld slider. Participants were exposed to
a virtual rollercoaster simulation. In two separate rides partici-
pants were asked to use the slider to report second by second on a
scale from 0 to 100% to what extent they felt located in the imme-
diate physical environment and to what extent they felt located in
the mediated virtual environment. The results revealed that par-
ticipants were able to integrate both localizations and distributed
their presence in both realities: 30 s after the onset of the presen-
tation they localized themselves in both the immediate and the
mediated environment. Most noteworthy, the findings indicated
an almost perfect inverse relationship between self-localization in
the two environments over time: the stronger self-localization in
the mediated environment at a certain point in time (e.g., 60%
after 60 s), the weaker the feeling of being localized in the immedi-
ate environment at the corresponding time during the other ride
(40% after 60 s).
A similar pattern of bilocated self-localization, may be expe-
rience in collaborative virtual environments, such as online role
playing games, in which users are represented by a virtual alter-
ego, commonly referred to as an avatar. A unique feature of
online role playing games is that players can navigate the game
world and control their avatar from a first- or third-person
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perspective. In the third-person perspective, players continuously
have a visual percept of their avatar while they control its move-
ments. This gaming mode may offer a non-pathological form of
self-experience in which, similarly to heautoscopy, gamers iden-
tify with their avatar from a third-person perspective (Ganesh
et al., 2012). Sense of agency and control over the avatar facili-
tate this kind of self-identification (Pearce and Artemesia, 2006;
Weibel et al., 2008) and some gamers seem indeed to identify
more strongly with their avatar than with their real self (Bessiere
et al., 2007; Yee et al., 2009). In heautoscopy, self-localization can
be either centered in the physical body or in the illusory body or
in both. This may also be the case in third-person perspective
gaming: self-location may alternate back and forth between the
player’s body and the avatar body, or, may be present in both the
gamer and the avatar simultaneously. Notably, compared to self-
referencing, avatar-referencing during online role playing games
has been shown to generate more activity in the angular gyrus at
the TPJ (Ganesh et al., 2012; Figure 1). Activity in this area is sig-
nificantly correlated with the duration of daily online gaming and
has been shown to be stronger in internet addicted adolescents
compared to non-addicted adolescents (Kim et al., 2012).
Further support for the hypothesis that mental bilocation may
be experienced in virtual environments is provided by full-body
illusions research, in which the unity of self and body is exper-
imentally manipulated by exposing participants to conflicting
multisensory cues by means of mirrors or simple virtual reality
devices (Ehrsson, 2007; Lenggenhager et al., 2007, 2009; Petkova
and Ehrsson, 2008; Petkova et al., 2011; see also, Connors et al.,
2012 for the use of hypnosis to recreate mirrored-self misiden-
tification delusion). In Lenggenhager et al. (2007) for example,
participants viewed the back of their body filmed from a distance
of 2m and projected onto on a 3D head-mounted video. The
participants’ back was stroked during 1min either synchronously
or asynchronously with respect to the virtually seen body. Self-
localization was measured by passively displacing the blindfolded
participants immediately after the stroking and asking them to
return to their initial position. In the synchronous stroking con-
dition, participants systematically mislocalized themselves toward
the virtual body (Lenggenhager et al., 2007, 2009). This drift
toward the virtual bodymight arise from the simultaneous encod-
ing of self-location with respect two competing frames of refer-
ence: a framed of reference centered at the location of the physical
body, and a frame of reference centered at the location of the vir-
tual body. Being constrained to indicate one single localization of
the self, participants might localize themselves at a “compromise”
location between the two competing location (Wissmath et al.,
2011).
SPATIAL PERSPECTIVE TAKING: SOCIAL BILOCATION
Converging evidence from the field of social neuroscience sug-
gests that people relate knowledge of their own body to under-
stand other people’s behavior (Grafton, 2009). Accordingly,
understanding others’ actions, intentions, and emotions have
been proposed to rely on mechanism of embodied simula-
tion (e.g., Becchio et al., 2012). Using a spontaneous motor
paradigm, Thirioux et al. (2010) investigated whether individuals
also embody others’ localizations, mentally locating themselves in
the position of other bodies during social interaction. Participants
observed a life-sized virtual tightrope walker leaning to her left
or right on a rope. In a first experiment task, they interacted
spontaneously with the tightrope walker by leaning when she
was leaning. In a second and third experiment task, they were
instructed to lean when the tightrope walker was leaning by either
imagining their body in the position of the tightrope walker’
body (rotation) or imagining their body at their actual body
position (mirror reflection). Interaction tilt patterns were indis-
tinguishable from rotation tilt patterns at both the motor and
the neural level, suggesting that during interaction participants
spontaneously located themselves in the walker’s body position.
Further evidence that social situations may influence self-
localization comes from studies investigating spatial perspective
taking, i.e., the ability to adopt the spatial perspective of another
person (Mainwaring et al., 2003; Zacks et al., 2003; Aichhorn
et al., 2006; David et al., 2008; Frischen et al., 2009; Tversky
and Hard, 2009; Zwickel, 2009; Schober and Carstensen, 2010;
Zwickel and Müller, 2010; Shelton et al., 2012). In an egocen-
tric frame of reference, objects and locations are encoded with
respect to one’s own body. Tversky and Hard (2009) have shown
that the mere presence of another person in the position to act
on objects induces a good proportion of respondents to describe
spatial relations from the other person’s point of view. This effect
is not limited to type of descriptors used, but, as confirmed
by recent neuropsychological evidence, entails a spatial remap-
ping of objects and locations with reference to the other person’s
body (Becchio et al., 2013). Patients affected by left egocentric
neglect—a failure in attending and reporting stimuli on the left
side of the body-centered space—were asked to describe different
arrays of objects from their own perspective, from the opposite
perspective, or from the point of view of another person actually
seated in front of them. Items presented on the left side and omit-
ted when report was required from the first-person perspective
could be recovered when patients assumed a different spatial per-
spective. Critically, no left neglect was observed when report was
required from the perspective of another person actually present
in the scene, suggesting that objects and locations were remapped
within an alter-centric frame of reference.
These findings suggest that in social situations people may
overcome their own position in space to localize themselves at
the position of the other person. But do people actually disen-
gage from an egocentric frame of reference when they represent
the scene from the perspective of another person? Could social
situations involve the simultaneous activation of multiple per-
spectives or reference frames? Samson et al. (2010) report that
observers are slower to make self-perspective judgments when the
scene includes an avatar looking from a different perspective. In
a series of experiments participants saw a picture of a room with
a human avatar facing one of the walls, and with red discs dis-
played on the walls. In the consistent perspective condition, both
the participant and the avatar could see the same amount of discs.
In the inconsistent perspective condition, the participant and the
avatar each saw a different amount of discs. Participants were then
asked to judge how many discs could be seen, either from their
own perspective or from the avatar’s perspective, while ignoring
the irrelevant perspective. Slower responses and more errors in
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the inconsistent perspective condition compared to the consistent
perspective condition were found both when participants judged
the avatar’s perspective and when they judge their own perspec-
tive. This indicates that, just as they were influenced by their own
visual perspective when judging what the avatar saw (egocentric
intrusions), so they could not prevent themselves from processing
the avatar perspective when judging their own visual experience
(alter-centric intrusions). Both perspectives appeared therefore to
be processed at the same time (Samson et al., 2010). Surtees et al.
(2012) and Surtees and Apperly (2012) report a similar effect of
simultaneous activation of multiple frames of reference in chil-
dren as young as 6 years old.When evaluating the appropriateness
of statements describing the position of two objects (a ball and a
reference object that was either a doll or a model chair), children
7–11 years old showed sensitivity to both an egocentric frame of
reference and an object intrinsic frame of reference. As for adults,
anchoring to the reference object was stronger when the reference
object was a social object (doll).
CANWE MENTALLY BILOCATE?
The aforementioned evidence suggests that mental bilocation
is a complex but genuine experience (see Table 1). In heau-
toscopy, self-location and first-person perspective are at the
position of the physical body and, simultaneously or in rapid
alternation, at the position of the heautoscopic body. Moreover,
self-identification can either refer to the physical body, to the
autoscopic body, or both. All three-dimensions of minimal
selfhood—self-localization, self-identification, and first-person
perspective—are therefore bilocated (Blanke and Metzinger,
2009).
Taking the perspective of another person, in contrast, seems
to involve bilocated self-localization but not dissociation in two
objects of identification: people locate themselves at the posi-
tion of the other person, but do not identify with the other
person’s body. Furthermore, although spatial positions might be
encoded within an alter-body centered reference frame, at the
phenomenal level, the world is still perceived from a unitary first-
perspective originating with the physical body. In virtual reality,
subjects may experience different forms of mental bilocation.
Depending on the characteristics of the mediated environment,
mental bilocation may vary along MPS dimensions, from dis-
tributed self-location over two places to transient identification
with virtual alter-ego. Factors that may influence mental biloca-
tion in virtual settings include: the variety of sensory stimulation
achievable, the pictorial realism, the possibility to act in real
time upon the virtual environment, the representation of par-
ticipant’s body in the virtual space, the presence of others, the
visual perspective (Coelho et al., 2006). A recent study by Petkova
et al. (2011), suggests that this latter factor—visual perspective—
together with the presence of a sufficiently humanoid body, may
be critical to trigger self-identification with the artificial body in
full-body illusions experiments. Participants self-identify with the
artificial body when the artificial body is seen from a first person-
perspective, i.e., as though directly looking down at one’s body.
Self-identification is absent or significantly weaker (in terms of
both subjective reports and physiological response to a threat
applied to the artificial body abdomen), when the artificial body is
seen from a third person-perspective. Independently from visual
perspective, no illusory body swapping is observed when the arti-
ficial body is substituted with a rectangular object, suggesting that
only objects that look like a human body can be “owned” (Petkova
and Ehrsson, 2008).
WHY BILOCATE?
The deep meaning of embodied cognition has been proposed to
lie in disembodied thought (Tversky, 2005; Tversky and Hard,
2009). Mental bilocation enriches this view suggesting that not
only the self can be located outside the physical body: it can be
located at two places at the same time. But why do we mentally
bilocate?
There are at least two ways to make sense of this “why-
question.” One way is to ask what are the necessary and sufficient
neurofunctional conditions for mental bilocation to take place
(Metzinger, 2009; see Figure 1). In this connection, pathologically
and experimentally induced states of bilocation are a particular
relevant target of investigation as they provide insights into the
brain mechanism for altered self-localization, self-identification,
and first-person perspective taking.Mental bilocation, however, is
not only observed under pathological or artificial conditions: it is
experienced, in the form of bilocated self-localization, in everyday
life during social interaction. This raises a second why-question:
what is mental bilocation for? Why do we spontaneously bi-
localize when we interact with others?
In these task described earlier (e.g., Samson et al., 2010),
bi-localization made individual performance worse. Adopting a
bilocated self-localizationmay, however, prove advantageous dur-
ing online social interaction (Frith, 2012). Understanding others’
actions, anticipating what they will do, and, at the same time,
planning an appropriate action in response require to localize
objects both with respect one’s body and with respect to another
person’s body. By changing the way spatial events are encoded,
mental bilocation may play an important role in construction of
a shared interpersonal space. Through mental bilocation, peo-
ple may escape the imposed body-centeredness and “invariable
perspective” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945) of their physical body and
circumvent the computational difficulties inherent in any inter-
personal mapping (Bråten and Gallese, 2004). On this view,
mental bilocation may be more than an “alteration” of nor-
mal selfhood (Blanke and Metzinger, 2009): it may instantiate
an important interpersonal function, enabling the simultaneous
activation of multiple frames of reference, before using inhibition
to select the most appropriate perspective (Gallese, 2009; Surtees
et al., 2012).
There is now considerable evidence that suggests that there
is an implicit form of mentalizing through which we can take
account of the mental states of others during joint action (Frith
and Frith, 2006; Sebanz and Knoblich, 2009). The knowledge and
desires of others are not explicitly represented as mental states.
Rather, the mental states of others are taken into account auto-
matically by altering the saliency and representation of objects
and actions that are at the focus of joint attention (Frith, 2012).
Mental bilocation may contribute to this process favoring the
on-line integration of self- and other-centered representations.
The “selfhood” we readily attribute to others, the inner feeling
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org March 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 71 | 4
Furlanetto et al. Bilocated mind
of “being-like-you” triggered by our encounter with others may
themselves depend on the possibility of being at two places—at
the position one’s physical body and at the position of the other
person’s body—at the same time.
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